The area of automated negotiation has been of particular interest in AI due to the important role negotiations play in facilitating understanding and the achievement of cooperation among entities with di ering interests, whether they be individuals, organizations, governments, or automated agents. This paper presents a strategic model for negotiation of alternative o ers, with speci c application to international crises. In this model, both players can opt out, and while one loses over time, the other gains (up to a point). Speci c issues are: con icting objectives and utility functions of parties and the impact of time on bargaining behavior in crisis. The general model has relevance to the hostage crisis from which it was built, and subsequent applicability in building an automated negotiation agent for experimental and training purposes.
Introduction
The negotiation process facilitates understanding and the achievement of cooperation among entities with di ering interests, whether they be individuals, organizations, governments, or automated agents. Our long term objective is the creation of a prototype automated negotiator, as part of the development of a simulation environment of a real world situation, in which negotiators can be trained and where experiments can be conducted. As a basis for the development of such a simulation environment, we have developed a formal theory of negotiations in order to analyze the negotiation situation and to determine the best strategies.
This paper presents a strategic model of negotiation, with speci c application to international crises as the rst step in developing such a theorem. Our work is based primarily on Arti cial Intelligence concepts. Related work in bargaining and negotiation theory, in the general realm of economics and game theory, and foreign policy analysis and crisis decisionmaking within the domain of political science, are suitably modi ed for use in an Arti cial Intelligence approach.
The speci c issues in the model are the con icting objectives and utilities of the parties and the impact of time on bargaining behavior. While the theoretical discussion and axioms and proofs apply to a general case of negotiation, the theory was built by focusing on a speci c hypothetical negotiation between real world international actors. In the process of formalizing the behavior of speci c actors, in consultation with regional and negotiation specialists, we identi ed areas for generalization; the resultant general model has relevance to the speci c case upon which it was based, as well as subsequent applicability in building an automated agent as a participant in a simulation of this case, and beyond this speci c case to the general class of crisis negotiations.
We begin by examining previous work in the elds of distributed arti cial intelligence, negotiation agents, and game theory. A brief description of the hostage crisis follows, serving as the substantive grounding for the theoretical work. We introduce the strategic negotiation model and review its central de nitions, theorems, and proofs. Finally, we revisit the hostage crisis in the light of the strategic negotiation model we have developed.
Previous and Related Work
In this section we will brie y review some of the related work in the areas of Arti cial Intelligence, bargaining and negotiation theory, and crisis analysis.
Previous Work in Arti cial Intelligence
The study of multi-agent interaction has been receiving increasing attention within Arti cial intelligence (AI). This is a direct outgrowth of the serious consideration currently being given to agents operating in challenging, real-world environments. For many years, highly restricted domains were considered su cient for AI research purposes, and agents such as Shakey 12] could be designed and built for operation in simpli ed, restricted environments.
The research on agent architectures and on planning typically made several standard assumptions, including the existence of a static domain, the lack of deadlines, and the existence of a single agent, i.e., our agent. Once researchers began, for a variety of reasons, to move into realistic domains, these assumptions had to be quickly discarded. The research in planning and agent architectures of the last decade has been focused precisely on the transformation of single-agent, atemporal, static theories into multi-agent, temporal, dynamically capable ones.
A community of researchers working on distributed arti cial intelligence (DAI) has arisen (for a survey of DAI see 1, 15] ). One of the most di cult subjects that has occupied the e orts of the DAI community has been the subject of negotiation 55, 19, 59, 41, 5, 9, 47, 51, 34, 64, 33, 11, 35, 61] .
Davis and Smith's work on the Contract Net 55] introduced a form of simple negotiation among cooperative agents, with one agent announcing the availability of tasks and awarding them to other bidding agents. Malone re ned this technique considerably by overlaying it with a more sophisticated economic model 41], proving optimality under certain conditions. While Davis and Smith's original work assumed some autonomy among agents, these agents willingly bid for tasks without explicit motivation. Malone's work introduced a motivational framework in the language of economic theory, and at the same time provided a more theoretical language in which to discuss the task-sharing algorithm.
These e orts in DAI and others that have followed dealt with negotiations in the case of cooperative systems which are designed to achieve a common general task, or in which the agents belong to the same organization or unit (see for example 19] which describes a method for synthesizing multi-agent plans from simple single-agent plans, 52] which deals with project management, 9] and 10] which deal with the vehicle monitoring domain, and 51] which deals with resource reallocations). Con icts among the agents in these environments may arise while each tries to achieve its own sub-tasks (for example, they may need to share the same resources), but their overall task is the same. Our work takes as a point of departure the work of researchers who have studied the negotiations that could take place among agents that serve the interests of truly distinct parties 59, 47, 63, 25, 30, 31] . The agents are autonomous; they have their own utility functions, and no global notion of utility plays a role in their design. The agents are individually motivated.
For example, Sycara 59 ] presented a model of negotiation that combines case-based reasoning and optimization of the multi-attribute utilities of the agents. She implemented her ideas in a computer program called the PERSUADER which resolved adversarial con icts in the domain of labor relations, and tested her system using simulations of such domains. While she concentrated on the perspective of the mediator (see also 23]), we want to analyze such situations from the point of view of the autonomous agents that participate in the con ict, and to concentrate on the time constraints of the situations.
Rosenschein and Genesereth 47] used certain game-theoretic techniques to model communication and promises in multi-agent interaction. There, the process of negotiation was severely restricted; the agents could only make single, simultaneous o ers. This work was extended by Zlotkin and Rosenschein in 63] . Using game theoretic results (mainly of Harsanyi 21] ), they introduced a negotiation protocol for the case of agents who are able to share a discrete set of tasks with one another. In their model the impact of the passage of time in the negotiation is not taken into consideration, and they assume that in each step at least one of the agents has to make a concession, otherwise con ict results.
Other extensions of this models were published in 64]. Comparing this work to ours, we make almost no assumptions about the protocol the agents use for negotiations. Also, our model takes the passage of time during the negotiation process itself into consideration, which in turn in uences the outcome of the negotiations and avoids delays in reaching an agreement. Matwin et al. 42] developed an expert system shell called Negoplan to support single party participants in a negotiation. Negoplan simulates the changes in the positions of the parties during the negotiation, based on their anticipated behavior. Their method does not simulate the entire process of negotiation since they give one party a competitive advantage. In simulating the overall simulation process, we concentrate on comparisons between one attribute subject of the negotiation and the outside options available to the negotiator.
In the work of Kraus, Lehmann and Ephrati, 26, 24, 27, 25] a general structure for a negotiator-agent was developed that functions in a complex environment, and several techniques for the performance of di erent tasks by such an agent were also developed. In the present study, we take a similar approach, while attempting to model a real world situation. In addition, we want to concentrate on a somewhat simpli ed case |less players, less issues to negotiate about| in order to be able to isolate di erent aspect of negotiations in such environments, to develop general theorems, and subject them to testing with computer models and human players.
Related Work in Economics and Game Theory
There are two main approaches for the development of theorems relating to the negotiation process. The rst is informal theories which attempt to identify possible strategies for a negotiator and to assist a negotiator in achieving optimal results (see 13, 8, 22] ). The other approach is the formal theory of bargaining originating with the work of John Nash ( 43] 44]), who attempted to construct formal models of negotiation environments and to prove di erent theorems about the best strategies a negotiator can follow under di erent circumstances. This formal game theory approach provides clear analyses of various situations and precise results concerning the strategy a negotiator should choose. On the other hand, it requires making restrictive assumptions that are unacceptable to the rst group.
Following Genesereth, Ginsberg, Rosenschein and Doyle, 16, 6, 7] , we propose the use of game-theoretic techniques for Arti cial Intelligence purposes. We propose to develop a strategic model of negotiation that can serve as the basis for building e cient automated negotiators. We realize that some of the assumptions we will be forced to make in developing the general strategic model will not be applicable in some situations, and in such cases we intend to use the informal theorems, referred to above, in order to ll in the gaps (in this respect our approach is similar to Rai a 46] ).
The formal game theory approach is also divided into two central sub-approaches concerning the bargaining problem (see 21] ). The rst is the strategic approach. The players' negotiating maneuvers are moves in a noncooperative game and the rationality assumption is expressed by investigation of the Nash Equilibrium. 1 The second approach is the axiomatic method. It makes assumptions about the solution of a negotiation situation without specifying the bargaining process itself (the literature on the axiomatic approach to bargaining is surveyed by Roth 48] ; 40] is a good introduction to game theory).
Since we intend to use our theoretical work as a basis for the development of automated negotiators, we have adopted the strategic approach. Rubinstein 49] and Sta _ hl 57] developed models of alternating o ers, which take time into consideration. Shaked and Sutton 54] extended these works by developing models in which a player can opt out of the game. Those works are closely related to our desired models (see 45] for a detailed review of the bargaining game of alternating o ers). Nevertheless, several important modi cation are needed. These mainly concern the way time in uences the preferences of the agents, the possibility that both agents can opt out, and the preferences of the agents over opting out.
Related Work in Crisis Analysis
Decision theorists have dealt quite extensively with the development of negotiation and bargaining strategy (for an excellent review of this literature, see 60] Our approach in the development of a model of strategic negotiation has been guided most directly by two studies. According to Snyder and Diesing 56] , the three types of bargaining in crisis are accommodative, coercive, and persuasive. In the accommodative approach, we note a convergence of the bargaining positions of the parties toward a settlement through a sequence of bids or proposals for settlement, involving demands, o ers, and concessions. Coercive bargaining is a process of showing rmness, involving threats and warnings, and in general exerting pressure to in uence the other party to accept one's position. Coercion includes the threat of harm. Persuasion also attempts to in uence the other party to accept one's position, but does not involve threatening harm. Both coercive and accommodative moves (threats and concessions) present the adversary with a choice between a pair of outcomes, one certain and the other uncertain. Persuasion involves moving the choice to one's own advantage 56] 195-198] .
A second typology with relevance to behavior patterns in crisis bargaining is proposed by Leng ( 37] While none of these approaches is directly incorporated into the strategic model of negotiation presented below, they have helped sharpen our conception of the process and helped us distill its central elements.
Another related work is of Fraser and Hipel 14] . They developed a formal method that permits a rapid assessment of complex con ict situations for the purpose of nding resolution to a con ict. The output from the analysis includes possible stable solutions to the con ict. Comparing their work to ours, we model the process of the negotiation itself, taking into account the passage of time during the negotiation. Our analysis provides negotiation strategies for the players that are in perfect equilibrium.
The Hostage Crisis
The speci c scenario which evolved during the course of our formalization of the crisis negotiation model was based on the hypothetical hijacking of a commercial airliner en route from Europe to Israel and its forced landing at Cairo International Airport. The passengers are predominantly Israeli, but there are a number of other nationals aboard. The hijackers are known to be Palestinian, although their precise a liation is not immediately clear (and hence the credibility of their threats is not known at the outset). The hijackers will eventually demand the release from Israeli security prisons of an undetermined number of Arab prisoners, and safe passage for the hijackers to an as yet undisclosed destination (for additional details see 32] .) The hostage crisis was chosen as a typical case of multiparty negotiation. Although this hypothetical case is quite speci c in details, the intention is to build a general model of negotiation. The choice of a real historical case would have increased the complexity of the model while at the same time reducing its potential generalizability.
Once the case was chosen, it was reduced to its essential characteristics. For example, this model consists of only three players: the terrorists, Israel, and Egypt (the latter plays the role of third party or mediator). We could have added additional players like the US or Syria, but we feel that these three adequately represent the most important types of players and their interests in such a negotiation. Similarly, we could have increased the number of options available to each player { for example, Israel could have had the option of kidnapping a prominent Palestinian leader, in addition to its two options of agreement with the terrorists or launching a military operation. Here again, we assume that the added complexity which additional options would entail would not add appreciably to the reliability or generalizability of the model. Israel, the terrorists (hijackers), and Egypt must consider six possible outcomes: Each party to the negotiation has a set of objectives, and a certain number of utility points is associated with each (see 28]). Utility points were assigned in order to express a complex set of preferences in such a way that subtle distinctions can be made among them. Short term objectives pertain to the resolution or management of the immediate crisis, while long term objectives have to do with the consequences for the policy of that actor once the immediate situation has been resolved.
For Israel, short-term objectives involve the safe return of the passengers and an acceptable level of casualties among Israeli military personnel in the event of military action. For the terrorists, short-term objectives include the release of prisoners held in Israeli jails, release of the hostages, and safe passage for the terrorists. Egypt is cast in the role of mediator or facilitator, and has no exclusively short term goals. Among Israel's major long-term goals is a cluster of factors relating to the credibility of its deterrence against terrorism, its overall strategic interests, and experience in counterterrorism. For the terrorists, long-term objectives include damage to Israel's internal and external image, damage to Israel's deterrence against terrorism, and damage to Israel's relations with the US and Egypt. For both Israel and the terrorists, the long term consequences are considerably more important than the resolution of the immediate situation.
As we have indicated, all of Egypt's objectives are long-term in nature. By far the most important Egyptian objective is its ability to demonstrate its control of the situation, and the maintenance of its internal image. Also of critical importance is Egypt's ability to emerge from the crisis with its relations with other Arab countries intact.
In combining the range of utility points associated with each objective with the six possible outcomes listed above, a matrix is generated which yields a point output total for the various outcomes. In the case of three of these outcomes { an Israeli or Egyptian military operation, and a terrorist decision to blow up the plane { probabilities are attached to the success or failure of such actions.
The speci c issues to be negotiated during the course of the crisis include the following: The concept of the passage of time is incorporated into the model in two ways. First, it provides a reference point for the calculation of utilities and probabilities. Second, time is a factor for the three parties, since the passage of time impacts on them di erentially.
In general, time works in favor of the terrorists, and against Israel and Egypt. This latter aspect of time sets up a complex negotiation dynamic for the crisis.
In general, time impacts on the following aspects of the model: (1) the probability of success of an Israeli or Egyptian military operation (having to do with whether the operation is launched in daylight or at night, time available for preparation of troops, deteriorating weather conditions, and condition of terrorists and hostages); (2) the extent of publicity for the terrorists' message; and (3) Israel and Egypt's internal and external images.
In the next section we will suggest a general negotiation model that can be used to capture some important properties of the negotiations taking place among the parties under the conditions outlined above. 2 
The Strategic Model of Negotiation
In this section we will describe a strategic model of negotiation. Any strategic model includes a detailed description of a bargaining procedure. Ours is a modi cation of Rubinstein's model of alternative o ers which focuses on the passage of time and the preferences of the players for di erent agreements as well as for opting out of the negotiations 49].
The outcomes of the model will be de ned as perfect equilibria which require that a player's strategy be optimal in each step of the game.
Using these notions we will analyze di erent kinds of negotiation situations. We will concentrate on cases where one of the players gains over time and the other loses (at least up to some period of time).
Description
We assume that the negotiation process is taking place during a crisis, where two players, the \Initiator" (I) of the crisis (terrorists) and the \Participant (against his will)" (P) in the crisis (Israel), are bargaining about the partition of M units of a desirable object (800 security prisoners in Israeli jails). The partitioning takes place only after both players have reached an agreement. In this model we focus on the negotiation process between Israel and the terrorists, and assume that Egyptian behavior is xed and known.
Negotiation is an iterative process that may include several iterations and may even continue forever. We assume that agents can take actions only at certain times in the set T = f0; 1; 2:::g.
In each period t 2 T one agent, say i, proposes an agreement, and the other agent (j) either accepts the o er (Y ) or rejects it (N) or opts out of the negotiation (O). 3 If the o er is accepted, then the negotiation ends, and the agreement is implemented. Also, opting out by j ends the negotiation. After a rejection, the rejecting agent then has to make a counter o er and so on. There are no rules which bind the agents to any previous o ers and there is no limit on the number of periods.
We will now present formal de nitions pertaining to the negotiation structure.
De nition 4. Throughout the rest of the paper, I's portion in an agreement will be written rst.
De nition 4.2 Negotiation Strategies:
A strategy is a sequence of functions. The domain of the ith element of a strategy is a sequence of agreements of length i and its range is the set fY; N; Og S. We rst de ne a strategy f for an agent i who is the rst agent to make an o er. Let F be the set of all sequences of functions f = ff Let (f; g) be a sequence of o ers possibly ending with O in which player 1 (who can be either I or P) starts the bargaining and adopts f 2 F, and player 2 adopts g 2 G. Let L(f; g) be the length of (f; g) (where the length may be in nite). Let La(f; g) be the last element of (f; g) (if there is such an element). La(f; g) may be either in S and in such a case we will call it the partition or may be O which denotes that one of the players opts out of the negotiation. We present a formal de nition for the outcome of the negotiation, when the agents use the strategies f and g.
De nition 4.3 Outcome of the Negotiation:
The outcome function of the game is de ned by
Thus, the outcome (s; t) where s 2 S is interpreted as the reaching of agreement s in period t, (O; t) is interpreted as one of the players opting out of the negotiations, and the symbol D indicates a perpetual disagreement with no player opting out.
The last component of the model is the preference of the players on the set of outcomes. Each player has preferences for agreements reached at various points in time, and opting out at various points in time. The time preferences and the preferences between agreements and opting out are the driving force of the model.
Formally, we assume that player i = I; P has a preference relation (complete, re exive, and transitive) i on the set fS T g ffOg T g fDg.
We note here that by de ning an outcome to be either a pair (s; t) or (O; t) or D, we have made a restrictive assumption about the agent's preferences. We assume that agents care only about the nature of the agreement or opting out, and the time at which the outcome is reached, and not about the sequence of o ers and countero ers that leads to the agreement. In particular, no agent regrets either making an o er that was rejected or rejecting an o er (see, for example, the discussion of \decision-regret" in 46]).
In studying the Hostage Crisis case we identi ed a set of conditions that the players' preference relations should satisfy. We determined that those conditions t a wide variety of cases.
First we assume that the least-preferred outcome is disagreement (D).
A0 Disagreement is the worst outcome: For every s 2 S and t 2 T , (s; t) i D. We assume that player I gains over time (c I > 0) and that player P loses over time (c P < 0), i.e., player P prefers to obtain any given number of units sooner rather than later, while player I prefers to obtain any given number of units later rather than sooner. 4 We note that assumption (A2) does not hold for O and the preferences of the players for opting out in di erent periods of time do not change in a stationary way. Furthermore, the preferences of a player for opting out versus an agreement uctuate across periods of time in a non-stationary fashion. 5 In the case of the Hostage Crisis this is due to di erent rates of change over time in the probabilities associated with success or failure of the actions taken when opting out.
We also assume that player P prefers to opt out sooner rather than later and vice versa for player I.
A3 Opting Out Over Time: If t 1 < t 2 (O; t 1 ) P (O; t 2 ) and (O; t 2 ) I (O; t 1 ). 4 Previous work on models of alternating o ers (see, for example 49], 54]) assumed that time is of value to all parties. The Hostage Crisis is a situation in which one side (the terrorists) gains over time, while the other side (Israel) loses over time. Another example of such a situation occurs when a company contests a government attempt to restrain its advertising of a harmful product { the longer the company can tie up the issue in court and continue to advertise, the more units it can sell; conversely, the longer the case drags on, the more the consuming public (the government's "client") will be harmed by continued consumption of the product. 5 Shaked and Sutton 54] considered the case where the players' preferences for opting out versus an agreement changes in a stationary manner.
Perfect Equilibrium
A useful notion for nding a good strategy is the Nash Equilibrium ( 44, 40] ). If there is a unique equilibrium, and if it is known that a player is designed to use this strategy, no agent will prefer to use a strategy other than this one.
However, the use of Nash Equilibrium is not an e ective way of analyzing the outcomes of the models of alternating o ers since it puts few restrictions on the outcome ( 49] ). Therefore, we will use the stronger notion of (subgame) perfect equilibrium (P.E.) (see 53]) which requires that the players' strategies induce an equilibrium in any subgame (see 29] for the full de nition).
Zone of Possible Agreement
When analyzing the model, the main question is whether a possibility exists that the players will reach an agreement. An important feature of the model that strongly in uences the outcome of the game is the preference of a player between an agreement and opting out. As we mentioned above, in our model the preferences of a player for opting out versus an agreement uctuate across periods of time in a non-stationary fashion and there is no xed s 2 S such that for every t 2 T , (s; t) (O; t) as in 54]. This is the result of our assumption that the utility function of opting out changes di erently over time than the utility function of an agreement. Therefore, we need the following de nition in order to compare agreements with opting out. is not empty then there will be only one minimalŝ i;t ; this is because of assumption A1 above. In order to avoid a discussion of extreme cases we will make the following assumption: For every t 2 T ifŝ P;t I 0 then (ŝ P;t ; t) P (O; t) andŝ P;t I < M ? c I ? 2. It is easy to extend the results of this paper after relaxation of this assumptions, but it will make the proofs longer and less readable. We note that in our formalization of the hostage crisis these assumptions are valid. To make the notation easier we will also assume that for any t 2 T , ((?1; M + 1); t) P ((?1; M + 1); t + 1).
We now introduce two additional assumptions that will ensure that an agreement will be reached. Assumption (A4) ensures that if there are some agreements player P prefers over opting out, then there is at least one of those agreements that player I also prefers over opting out in the next period. We note that the assumption (ŝ P;t ; t) P (ŝ P;t+1 ; t + 1) is not derived from the assumption (O; t) P (O; t + 1) (A3).
A4
Assumption (A4) alone does not ensure that an agreement is always possible. Let us consider the case that player P prefers to opt out over any agreement in the rst period, i.e.,ŝ P;0 = ?1. In this case, if I starts the negotiation, it will end immediately by P opting out. If P starts the negotiation, since it must make an o er, the crisis may end with an agreement. Proof: The proofs of the lemmas and theorems appear in the appendix.
We can conclude that another assumption is necessary to ensure that an agreement may be reached, which states that an agreement is possible at least in the rst period. 2 S is the worst agreement for player P in period 0 which is still better than opting out. So, the requirement that I's portion of this agreement will be at least zero, ensures that there exists at least one agreement player P prefers over opting out. Using assumption (A4) which ensures that if there are some agreements player P prefers over opting out, then there is at least one of those agreements that player I prefers over opting out in the next period; together with assumption (A3) which requires that player I prefers to opt out later rather than sooner, we may conclude that there also exists an agreement that player I prefers over opting out in the rst period. We determined that assumptions (A4) and (A5) are valid in the Hostage Case, but we note that those assumptions do not necessarily mean that agreement will be reached in such situations.
We will show now that under the above assumptions, if there exists a period when player P will prefer opting out over any agreement and the game has not ended in prior periods, then an agreement will be reached in the period prior to this period. If it is P's turn, it will o er its preferable agreements among the agreement that I prefers over opting out in the next period, and visa versa if it is I's turn.
Lemma 2 Let (f;ĝ) be a Perfect Equilibrium (P.E.) of a model satisfying A0-A5. Suppose for some T 2 T ;ŝ P;T I 0 andŝ P;T +1 I = ?1. If it is P's turn then using his P.E. strategy he will suggest max P fs j(s; T) I (O; T + 1)g, and if it is I's turn he will suggestŝ P;T . In both cases the other party will accept the o er.
Player P Loses More Than Player I Gains
In this section we will assume that player P's losses over time are greater than player I's gains. In this model, for any agreement in period t 2 T , there is no other agreement in the future that both players will prefer over this agreement. On the other hand if an agreement s in period t is small enough, one can nd an agreement in a period earlier than t which both players prefer over s in period t. According to our assumptions, this property will cause the players to reach an agreement in the rst period.
First we consider the case in which player P starts the negotiations. We prove that in each period if an agreement exists which player P prefers over opting out there exists such an agreement which player I cannot reject. The idea is the following. Player P will accept or make an o er only if it is better for him than opting out. If I receives an o er such that there is no better agreement for him in the future, and it is also better for P than opting out in the future, and if he prefers this o er over P opting out in the next period, he must accept this o er. Otherwise, if this agreement is rejected, P should opt out as soon as possible, since he cannot expect to do any better than opting out. But if I prefers the proposed agreement over P's opting out in the next time period, he should accept the o er. We will show that such an agreement really exists under our assumptions. Lemma 3 Let (f;ĝ) be a Perfect Equilibrium (P.E.) of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that jc P j jc I j+1 and player 1 is of type P. For any T 2 T such that T is even (player P's turn) 6 We would like to de ne the x T which is preferred by player P. That is, the best agreement for P that is acceptable to I.
De nition 4.5 Let (f;ĝ) be a Perfect Equilibrium (P.E.) as in lemma 3. For every T 2 T we denote byx We would like to prove a similar lemma to lemma 3 for player P, i.e. whether a suggestion exists which player P will always accept. This is much easier since player P loses over time and therefore he will always accept an agreement that is better for him than the best agreement he can reach in the next period (i.e., (0; M)), which is also better for him than opting out.
Lemma 5 Let (f;ĝ) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that P is the rst player. We will show now that any agreement that will be reached in some period T 2 T where there is still a possibility for reaching an agreement in the next time period, will be at most (from P's point of view) the worst agreement to P which is still better to it than opting out, i.e.,ŝ P;T . The reason for that is that if there is still a possibility for an agreement in the next period, I wants to delay reaching an agreement. By o eringŝ P;T he prevents P from opting out, and gains another period of time. On the other hand, I won't accept anything worth less to him thanŝ P;T , since he can always wait until the next period, gain a period, and reach such an agreement.
Lemma 6 Let (ĝ;f) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5. Ifŝ We will show in the next lemma that player I won't o er less in period T 2 T thanŝ P;T . This is mainly since otherwise, P will opt out.
Lemma 7 Let (ĝ;f) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5. Ifŝ We would like to prove now that player P does not have a better strategy than to o er x P;T whenever it is his turn to make an o er and he still prefers an agreement over opting out. This is since P may receive in the future (some period t), at mostŝ P;t . Butx P;T which is the best agreement for P which is acceptable to I in period T is better for P thatŝ is acceptable to P, since it can't get anything better in the future and it is better than opting out.
Theorem 2 Let (f;ĝ) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that the rst player is of type I. Ifŝ Up to this point we have assumed that jc P j c I + 1 (this is the case in the terrorist-Israel negotiations). We now want to consider the case when jc P j < c I + 1. 7 In such a case for any suggestion, if it is big enough, it is possible to nd a suggestion in the future that will be better for both sides. Although it might appear that such an assumption will cause long delays in reaching an agreement, we will prove that in fact the delay will be at most one period.
The intuition behind this proof is as follows. If it is not player P's turn to make an o er in some time period t, he can always opt out and gain something equivalent toŝ P;t . So, in time period t ? 1 P will never make a better o er to I thanŝ P;t I ? c P , which is his bene t from opting out in the next period with the addition of P's loss over time. But I will refuse such an o er, since I prefers waiting a period and o ering Pŝ P;t 2 S. This o er will prevent P from opting out, and if he accepts the o er I's share will beŝ P;t I + c I which is better to I thanŝ P;t I ? c P since jc P j < c I + 1.
First we will show that an agreement won't be achieved when it is P's turn to make an o er and there is still the possibility of an agreement in the next period.
Lemma 9 Let (f;ĝ) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that jc P j < c I + 1 and P is the rst player. If it is P's turn in time period T In the next lemma we will prove that in any period t when it is player I's turn he will o er at most (from P's point of view)ŝ P;t . It will prevent P from opting out.
Lemma 10 Let (f;ĝ) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that jc P j < c I + 1 and P is the rst player. If it is I's turn andŝ In the next lemma we show that if I o ers P something less preferable by P thanŝ P;t , P will opt out. Theorem 3 Let (f;ĝ) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that jc P j < c I + 1, then if P is the rst player P(f;ĝ) = (ŝ P;1 ; 1).
We will now prove a similar theorem for the case in which player I is the rst player.
Theorem 4 Let (f;ĝ) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that jc P j < c I + 1, then if I is the rst player P(f;ĝ) = (ŝ P;0 ; 0).
Player I's situation changes from winning to losing over time
In the hostage crisis there is some point when the terrorists stop gaining and start losing over time (see 28]). We want to consider such models and to show that our results are still valid.
Suppose there is some T c 2 such that from that period on player I stops gaining and starts losing over time. We assume that I's loses after T c are smaller than P's loses at these time periods. That still gives I an advantage over P.
Formally we would like to replace (A2) by (A2').
A2' Agreement's Cost Over Time: Let T c ; t 1 ; t 2 2 T such that T c 2. We will assume that t i = t 1 Furthermore, we assume that after T c I prefers to opt out sooner rather than later, but until T c he prefers to opt out later rather than sooner. We don't make any assumptions concerning I's preference between opting out before T c and opting out after this time period. We note that theorem 1 is still valid. This is mainly because even though player I starts losing from period T c , our assumption that his losses are smaller than those of player P leaves him in a position which is still better than player P. Therefore, what player P can gain from the subgame starting in period T c is not better than (x Figure 1 presents a general summary of our results concerning the model's behavior under di erent conditions. We focus on the identi cation of the most important factors which in uence the outcomes of negotiations under di ering circumstances. For example, in Case 1 player P makes the rst o er. The \yes"s in the third and fourth columns indicate that the worst agreement to player P which he still prefers over opting out is not less than zero, i.e., there exists an agreement in those periods which he prefers over opting out. The \yes" in the fth column indicates that player P loses over time more than player I gains. The last column indicates that an agreement will be reached in the rst period and player I will get s P;1 I + c I + 1 and player P M ? (ŝ P;1 I + c I + 1). The fourth column in Case 2, for example, indicates that this case actually represents multiple cases, i.e.,ŝ P;1 can be either at least zero, but also may be less than zero.
Factors In uencing the Outcome
The single most important in uence on the nature of the agreement reached by the players isŝ P;t , i.e., the worst agreement which player P will agree to in period t which is still better for him than opting out in this period (see cases 1,2,6 in Figure 1 ). The intuition behind this result is that since we assume that player I also prefers an agreement ofŝ P;t over the option of opting out in period t, player P's threat of opting out turns out to be credible. On the other hand, since player I gains over time, he can a ord to wait and therefore he does not have to suggest or accept an o er which is worse for him thanŝ A second factor which in uences the outcome is the question of which player begins the negotiation process. If player P starts the negotiation, it creates an advantage for player I (compare cases 1 and 2, cases 6 and 2 and 3 and 4). This is the case because it delays the threat of player P to opt out for at least one period. Since the passage of time works to the advantage of player I and against player P, player I bene ts from the delay. However, if we assume that all players are allowed to opt out in any period, the result will change, since I will then lose part of its advantage.
The ratio of how much player I gains over time (c I ) to how much player P loses over time (c P ) determines the time period in which an agreement is reached, when player P starts the negotiation (compare cases 1 and 6 in Figure 1 ). If c P c I + 1, then agreement will be reached in the rst period (if in fact an agreement is reached at all), and if c P < c I + 1, then an agreement will be reached in the second period. This results from a property of the second model, that no agreement in a current period can be better for both parties than a speci c agreement in the future. In particular, no agreement in period t is better for both parties than reaching an agreementŝ P;t+1 in period t + 1.
The Hostage Crisis Revisited
Since one of our aims in developing the above theorems is to use them in the speci c negotiation situation we deal with, we want to demonstrate how these theorems are applicable in this case. We concentrate on the Israel-terrorist negotiation process which involves the number of prisoners that will be released from Israeli prisons in exchange for the release of all the hostages on the plane.
In order for the results of Section 4 will be applicable, we need to make the following assumptions:
1. Full information -Israel and the terrorists know each others preferences.
2. Rational behavior -both sides use the notion of perfect equilibrium when choosing their strategies.
3. Egypt's behavior is xed and known to both sides.
4. Commitments are enforced.
5.
Assumptions (1)- (4) are common knowledge.
In our case S = f(0; 799); (1; 798); :::; (799; 0)g. Since we assume that an agreement between Israel and the terrorists requires that Israel release at least one prisoner 28], an agreement (s 1 ; s 2 ) 2 S is interpreted as Israel releasing s 1 + 1 prisoners. Israel is a player of type P and the terrorists initiate the crisis (type I). We denote Israel by P I s and the terrorists by I T .
As we explained in Section 3, while formalizing the situation we attached utilities and probabilities to the possible outcomes and the way they are changing over time. We determined that through time period 10, the terrorists gain over time, and from time period 11 on, the terrorists lose over time; Israel loses over time across all periods of the game.
We determined that Israel's utility from releasing x prisoners depends on three factors: a positive constant (D P Is ) which is determined by Egypt's behavior, a constant loss from the release of each prisoner (v P Is ) and the loss over time d It is more di cult to analyze the preferences of the parties for opting out in di erent periods and especially di cult to compare the option of opting out with an agreement. Nevertheless, we were able to establish that assumptions of section 4 hold in our case; A0 Disagreement is the worst outcome.
A1
The prisoners are desirable. A2 Agreement's Cost Over Time{ as we demonstrated above, Israel prefers to release any given number of prisoners sooner rather than later, while the terrorists through period 10 prefer to obtain any given number of prisoners later rather than sooner.
A3 Opting Out Over Time | Israel prefers to opt out sooner rather than later. 8 The terrorists, through period 10, prefer opting out later rather than sooner.
A4 Possible Agreement | The terrorists prefer any possible agreement over opting out.
Israel prefers its worst agreement in time period t which is still better than opting out, in time t (ŝ P Is ;t ; t) over the worst agreement in time period t + 1 which is still better than opting out, in time t + 1 (ŝ P Is ;t+1 ; t + 1).
A5 Possible Agreement in the First Period. Now, we need to determine which of the conditions discussed in Section 4 actually occur in our case. That is, we need to check how the factors that in uence the outcomes operate in the hostage crisis.
In the case of any Egyptian behavior jc P Is j > c I T + 1. Even thoughŝ (1)- (5) above that agreement will be reached in the rst period. The details of the agreement depend of who starts the negotiations. From our results one can also learn what strategies an automated Israeli or terrorist player needs to adopt if the simulation is played out under the above conditions. The authors are currently working on the design of such an automated negotiator.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a strategic model for negotiation of alternative o ers which takes into account the e ect of time on the negotiation process. In our model both players can opt out, and one of the players loses over time and the other gains over time (at least up to some future point). We show that if there is a zone for an agreement, an agreement will be reached in the rst or the second period of the negotiation.
We formalized a hostage crisis and showed that under certain assumptions the strategic model can be used to analyze this crisis. One of the assumption was that Egypt's behavior is known and xed throughout the negotiations. Even after relaxation of this assumption a player can use our results to determine his preferences for Egypt's behavior. This can be done by examining the factors that in uence the outcomes in each of the cases.
Do we think that in real situations and even in simulations of such situations an agreement will be reached in the rst or second periods? We suspect not (see 32, 20, 50] ). Rather, we think that after relaxation of the full information condition and taking into consideration the behavior of a third party, delays in reaching an early agreement will appear. In future work we intend to develop models that will be able to capture these situations. i.e., there is no agreement that P prefers over opting out in any time period. By (A3) if t 1 < t 2 then (O; t 1 ) P (O; t 2 ), i.e., it is better for P to opt out sooner rather than later. Therefore, if I starts the negotiation P will opt out immediately. If player P starts the negotiation he must make an o er. 9 By assumption (A2), f 0 = 0 and using similar arguments as in the previous case we can conclude that f 1 If it is P's turn then using his P.E. strategy he will suggest max P fs j(s; T) I (O; T + 1)g, and if it is I's turn he will suggestŝ P;T . In both cases the other party will accept the o er.
Proof: Suppose that it is P 0 s turn. Sinceŝ 
= N. We may consider two cases. If for some t 1, P(f;ĝ) = (O; T + t) then (O; T + t) I (X T ; T). Since (x T ; T) I (O; T + 1) (by 4), we can conclude that t 2. But (O; T + 1) P (O; T + t) by A4 and therefore if the crisis is ended by opting out, P will prefer to do it sooner rather than later, and not wait until T + t. So, we can conclude that P(f;ĝ); x T ) 6 = (O; t). Now suppose P(f;ĝ) = (s; T + t) for some s 2 S and t 2 T and t 1, such that We will show now that any agreement that will be reached in some period T 2 T where there is still a possibility for reaching an agreement in the next time period, will be at most (from P's point of view) the worst agreement to P which is still better to it than opting out, i.e.,ŝ P;T . Lemma 6 Let (ĝ;f) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5. Ifŝ On the other hand, I won't accept anything worth less to him thanŝ P;T , since he can always wait until the next period, gain a period, and reach such an agreement.
Lemma 7 Let (ĝ;f) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5. Ifŝ . By lemma 6, for every t > T ifŝ P;t+1 I 0 any agreement that will be reached in any such period t will be at mostŝ Proof: Any outcome of the crisis after time period T should be preferred by player P than (O; T + 1) since player P can always opt out in period T + 1. ; t + 1) I (ŝ P;t ; t) and the claim is clear. In the next lemma we will prove that in any period t when it is player I's turn he will o er at leastŝ P;t . Lemma 10 Let (f;ĝ) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that jc P j < c I + 1 and P is the rst player. If it is I's turn andŝ . But by (A4) and (A3) we can conclude that for every t 2 T , ifŝ P;t I 0 (ŝ P;T +1 ; T +1) P (ŝ P;T +t+1 ; T +t +1). Therefore, it is su cient to show that player I won't suggest or accept an o er which player P prefers over (ŝ P;T +1 ; T + 1). But this is clear from lemma 10.
Theorem 3 Let (f;ĝ) be a P.E. of a model satisfying A0-A5 such that jc P j < c I + 1, then if P is the rst player P(f;ĝ) = (ŝ P;1 ; 1).
Proof: By lemma 9 it is clear that an agreement won't be reached in the rst period. By lemma 10 and lemma 11 and since (ŝ Proof: It is clear that lemma 10 and lemma 11 are still valid under the assumption that I is the rst player. Therefore P(f;ĝ) = (ŝ P;0 ; 0).
